Act ii costumes currently has $120,000 in cash, $340,000 in inventory, and $20,000 in accounts receivable. the company also has $20,000 in accounts payable, and $20,000 in other current liabilities. what is its current (or working capital) ratio?

You hear your supervisor tell another supervisor that a fire drill will take place later today when the fire alarm sounds that afternoon you should

Assume that a local bank sells two services, checking accounts and atm card services. the bank’s only two customers are mr. donethat and ms. beenthere. mr. donethat is willing to pay $8 a month for the bank to service his checking account and $2 a month for unlimited use of his atm card. ms. beenthere is willing to pay only $5 for a checking account, but is willing to pay $9 for unlimited use of her atm card. assume that the bank can provide each of these services at zero marginal cost. refer to scenario 17-5. if the bank is unable to use tying, what is the profit-maximizing price to charge for a checking account

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?