Devon interacts directly with the employees in the work area to identify problem areas. he works with various departments to obtain a holistic idea of the business. this type of direct supervision is an example of control.

Gino's restaurant is a popular restaurant in boston, massachusetts. the owner of the restaurant has been trying to better understand costs at the restaurant and has hired a student intern to conduct an activity-based costing study. the intern, in consultation with the owner, identified the following major activities: activity cost pool activity measure serving a party of diners number of parties served serving a diner number of diners served serving drinks number of drinks ordered some costs, such as the cost of cleaning the linens that cover the restaurant's tables, vary with the number of parties served. other costs, such as washing plates and glasses, depends on the number of diners served or the number of drinks served. data concerning these activities are shown below. serving a party serving a dinner serving drinks total total cost $47,600 $153,000 $59,800 $260,400 total activity 7,000 parties 30,000 diners 46,000 drinks prior to the activity-based costing study, the owner knew very little about the costs of the restaurant. she knew that the total cost for the month was $260,400 and that 30,000 diners had been served. therefore, the average cost per diner was $8.68.required: 1. compute the activity rates for each of the three activities 2. according to the activity-based costing system, what is the total cost of serving each of the following parties of diners? a. a party of four diners who ordered three drinks in total b. a party of two diners who do not order any drinks c. a lone diner who orders two drinks 3. convert the total costs you computed in part (1) above to costs per diner. in other words, what is the average cost per diner for serving each of the following parties: a. a party of four diners who order three drinks in total b. a party of two diner who do not order any drinks c. a lone diner who orders two drinks 4. why do the costs per diner for the three different parties differ from each other and from the overall average coast of $9.80 per diner?

Kiona co. set up a petty cash fund for payments of small amounts. the following transactions involving the petty cash fund occurred in may (the last month of the company's fiscal year). may 1 prepared a company check for $350 to establish the petty cash fund. 15 prepared a company check to replenish the fund for the following expenditures made since may 1. a. paid $109.20 for janitorial services. b. paid $89.15 for miscellaneous expenses. c. paid postage expenses of $60.90. d. paid $80.01 to the county gazette (the local newspaper) for an advertisement. e. counted $26.84 remaining in the petty cashbox. 16 prepared a company check for $200 to increase the fund to $550. 31 the petty cashier reports that $380.27 cash remains in the fund. a company check is drawn to replenish the fund for the following expenditures made since may 15. f. paid postage expenses of $59.10. g. reimbursed the office manager for business mileage, $47.05. h. paid $48.58 to deliver merchandise to a customer, terms fob destination. 31 the company decides that the may 16 increase in the fund was too large. it reduces the fund by $50, leaving a total of $500.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?