Zero, inc. agreed to build millie a storage building for $8,000. after beginning the project, zero realized that it could not complete the job and make a profit. zero demanded $9,500 to complete the building. millie agreed to pay the $9,500. when the project was complete, millie tendered $8,000 to zero for the job. if zero sues millie for the remaining $1,500:
a. zero will win because there was consideration for the additional $1,500.
b. zero will win because millie had a pre-existing duty to pay any additional amounts.
c. zero will lose because there was no legal consideration to support the additional $1,500.
d. zero will lose because the ucc does not require consideration to modify an existing contract.

You invest all the money you earned during your summer sales job (a total of $45,000) into the stock of a company that produces fat and carb-free cheetos. the company stock is expected to earn a 14% annual return; however, 5 years later it is only worth $20,000. turns out there wasn't as much demand for fat and carb-free cheetos as you had hoped. what is the annual rate of return on your investment?

Christopher kim, cfa, is a banker with batts brothers, an investment banking firm. kim follows the energy industry and has frequent contact with industry executives. kim is contacted by the ceo of a large oil and gas corporation who wants batts brothers to underwrite a secondary offering of the company's stock. the ceo offers kim the opportunity to fly on his private jet to his ranch in texas for an exotic game hunting expedition if kim's firm can complete the underwriting within 90 days. according to cfa institute standards of conduct, kim: a) may accept the offer as long as he discloses the offer to batts brothers. b) may not accept the offer because it is considered lavish entertainment. c) must obtain written consent from batts brothers before accepting the offer.

Suppose that two firms produce differentiated products and compete in prices. as in class, the two firms are located at two ends of a line one mile apart. consumers are evenly distributed along the line. the firms have identical marginal cost, $60. firm b produces a product with value $110 to consumers. firm a (located at 0 on the unit line) produces a higher quality product with value $120 to consumers. the cost of travel are directly related to the distance a consumer travels to purchase a good. if a consumerhas to travel a mile to purchase a good, the incur a cost of $20. if they have to travel x fraction of a mile, they incur a cost of $20x. (a) write down the expressions for how much a consumer at location d would value the products sold by firms a and b, if they set prices p_{a} and p_{b} ? (b) based on your expressions in (a), how much will be demanded from each firm if prices p_{a} and p_{b} are set? (c) what are the nash equilibrium prices?