By tying a manager's compensation to the performance of the firm relative to that of its competitors, corporate stockholders and directors create incentives that tend to resolve the a. principal–agent problem. b. hidden agenda scenario. c. possibility of bankruptcy. d. firm's opportunity costs.

Suppose the marginal damage and marginal benefit curves in a polluted neighborhood are md = p/3 and mb = 4 – p. also, suppose that transactions costs are low, so that the consumers and the firm can bargain. we saw that in this case, the socially-optimal level of pollution is achieved. start by computing the socially-optimal p. then, for each of the following cases, compute the amount of money transferred through the bargaining process, and indicate who pays whom (i. e., whether consumers pay the firm, or vice versa). also, compute the gains to each party relative to the status quo (i. e., the starting point of the bargaining process).a)consumers have the right to clean air; firm is dominant in the bargaining process. b)consumers have the right to clean air; consumers are dominant in the bargaining process. c)firm has the right to pollute; firm is dominant in the bargaining process. d)firm has the right to pollute; consumers are dominant in the bargaining proces

A. j. was a newly hired attorney for idle time gaming, inc. even though he reported directly to the president of the company, a. j. noticed that the president always had time to converse with the director of sales, calling on him to get a pulse on legal/regulatory issues that, as the company attorney, a. j. could have probably handled. a. j. also noted that the hr manager’s administrative assistant was the go-to person for a number of things that would make life easier at work. a. j. was recognizing the culture at idle time gaming.

In our daily interactions we can find ourselves listening to other people solely for the purpose of finding weakness in their positions so that we can formulate a convincing response. select one: true false