name one form of collusion

question 20 options:

price lowering

profit sharing

price fixing

profit maximization

Consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output q1. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes q1 and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p = 100 - q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals q1 +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of q1 and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses q1 first and firm 2 observes q1 and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-? 1 and ? 2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of q1 would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of q1? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f > 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q1, denoted by q1b, as a function of f. next, derive the expression for firm 1

The hawthorne works was a large western electric factory with 45,000 employees. during the 1920s and 1930s, hawthorne works was the site of some well-known industrial studies. in one of the studies, researchers investigated the impact of different working conditions on worker productivity. prior to the start of the study, researchers secretly measured workers' productivity for several weeks. then researchers chose two workers, who then chose their own teams. the teams were separated from the general workforce and completed their work in different experiment rooms where the researchers could observe them more easily. over a 5-year period researchers manipulated the structure of the workday for each team (number and duration of breaks and number of hours per shift). for each of these changes in working conditions, the researchers measured the effect on productivity. for some conditions, such as frequent short breaks, workers rebelled by intentionally decreasing productivity. why did the researchers secretly measure the workers' productivity before creating the two treatment groups? a, to create similar treatment groups so that a cause-and-effect relationship could be establishedb, to draw conclusions about the productivity of all workers in the plant based on the test groupsc, to directly control for confounding variablesd, to provide a baseline for measuring worker productivity

Need with my trade theory homework. i doubt what i wrote was right. consider a monopolistically competitive market for soft drinks in which n symmetric firms face the following demand function: q=s(1/n-b(p-(p with the straight line on which implies the marginal revenue functionmr=p-(q/sb)finally, suppose firms face the total cost functiontc=900,000+100qsuppose the market size, s, is 27,000,000, and the elasticity parameter b is 0.003.diagram the price and the average total cost in the market as a function of the number of firms. what are the equations for each curve, and why does each curve slope up or down? label the equilibrium number of firms and the equilibrium price in the diagram. why is this the equilibrium?