In a small european country, it is estimated that changing the level of capital from $8 million to $10 million will increase real gdp from $2 million to $3 million. what level of gdp would you expect the economy to be able to reach if spending on capital continued to rise to $12 million, assuming no technological change and no change in the hours of work? a) gdp would increase further, but by less than $1 million b) gdp would increase further by exactly $1 million c) gdp would increase further by exactly $4 million d) gdp would increase further by more than $1 million

As a group is leaving, you ask them if they had a good experience at the restaurant. they mention that they had poor service and their food was cold. a. apologize and ask them to give the restaurant another chance in the future. you tell them that guests usually have a great experience here. b. apologize then ask for the server’s name and immediately notify the manager after they leave. c. apologize for the bad experience and ask them to wait as you call the manager to talk to them. d. apologize for the bad experience and encourage them to complete the customer service survey. this feedback will ensure other guests do not have the same experience.

If a bond is issued at a premium the effective interest rate is most likely

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?