subject
Business, 18.10.2019 00:30 kayltosh2729

The members of the federal reserve’s board of governors a. are elected to office by the public every fourteen years. b. are nominated by the u. s. senate banking committee and confirmed by the u. s. house of representatives. c. are elected by bankers in each federal reserve region. d. are appointed by the president of the u. s. and confirmed by the u. s. senate.

ansver
Answers: 2

Other questions on the subject: Business

image
Business, 22.06.2019 11:00, roseemariehunter12
In each of the following cases, find the unknown variable. ignore taxes. (do not round intermediate calculations and round your answers to the nearest whole number, e. g., 32.) accounting unit price unit variable cost fixed costs depreciation break-even 20,500 $ 44 $ 24 $ 275,000 $ 133,500 44 4,400,000 940,000 8,000 75 320,000 80,000
Answers: 3
image
Business, 22.06.2019 18:40, bella2331
Under t, the point (0,2) gets mapped to (3,0). t-1 (x, y) →
Answers: 3
image
Business, 22.06.2019 20:20, jskdkfjf
Fractional reserve banking which of the following statements about fractional reserve banking are correct? check all that apply. fractional reserve banking allows banks to create money through the lending process. fractional reserve banking does not allow banks to hold excess reserves. fractional reserve banking allows banks to create additional wealth by lending some reserves. fractional reserve banking relies on everyone not withdrawing their money at the same time.
Answers: 2
image
Business, 23.06.2019 00:00, silonis21
1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?
Answers: 3
You know the right answer?
The members of the federal reserve’s board of governors a. are elected to office by the public every...

Questions in other subjects:

Konu
Mathematics, 18.09.2020 05:01
Konu
Mathematics, 18.09.2020 05:01
Konu
Mathematics, 18.09.2020 05:01
Konu
Mathematics, 18.09.2020 05:01
Konu
Mathematics, 18.09.2020 06:01
Konu
Mathematics, 18.09.2020 06:01
Konu
Spanish, 18.09.2020 06:01
Konu
History, 18.09.2020 06:01
Konu
Mathematics, 18.09.2020 06:01
Konu
Mathematics, 18.09.2020 06:01