The following is the adjusted trial balance of sierra company. account title debit credit cash $ 5,000 prepaid insurance 500 notes receivable (due in 5 years) 4,000 buildings 20,000 accumulated depreciation–buildings $ 12,000 accounts payable 2,500 notes payable (due in 3 years) 3,000 h. sierra, capital 10,500 h. sierra, withdrawals 1,000 consulting revenue 9,500 wages expense 3,500 depreciation expense–buildings 2,000 insurance expense 1,500 totals $ 37,500 $ 37,500 required (1) prepare an income statement for the year ended december 31. (2) prepare a statement of owner’s equity for the year ended december 31.

The owners of spokes bicycle shop worry that cash flow this winter may be insufficient to meet the current operating expenses. while they anticipate a surplus of cash inflow as warm weather approaches, they need funds now to meet the company's immediate obligations. the owners can best resolve cash flow concerns by obtaining financing.

What is private equity investing? who participates in it and why? how is palamon positioned in the industry? how does private equity investing compare with public market investing? what are the similarities and differences between the two? why is palamon interested in teamsystem? does it fit with palamon’s investment strategy? how much is 51% of teamsystem’s common equity worth? use both a discounted cash flow and a multiple-based valuation to justify your recommendation. what complexities do cross-border deals introduce? what are the specific risks of this deal? what should louis elson recommend to his partners? is it a go or not? if it is a go, what nonprice terms are important? if it’s not a go, what counterproposal would you make?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?