On may 1, year 1, garcia company paid $1,200 for 12 months of rent and recorded the transaction in an income statement account. the adjusting journal entry required on december 31, year 1, will require a:

The following transactions occurred during july: received $1,000 cash for services provided to a customer during july. received $4,000 cash investment from bob johnson, the owner of the business received $850 from a customer in partial payment of his account receivable which arose from sales in june. provided services to a customer on credit, $475. borrowed $7,000 from the bank by signing a promissory note. received $1,350 cash from a customer for services to be rendered next year. what was the amount of revenue for july?

As you have noticed, the demand for flip phones has drastically reduced, and there are only a few consumer electronics companies selling them at extremely low prices. also, the current buyers of flip phones are mainly categorized under laggards. which of the following stages of the industry life cycle is the flip phone industry in currently? a. growth stage b. maturity stage c. decline stage d. commercialization stage

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?