Fruited plain, inc., agrees to sell high-quality grain seed to grange co-op. because only half of the quantity ordered is available, fruited plain ships a lesser quality seed in twice the amount of the remainder of the order for the same price. grange co-op rejects the lesser quality seed. with time for performance not yet expired, fruited plain cana. attempt to cure the defect. b. cancel the contract. c. recover the amount of its expected profit plus incidental damages. d. resell or dispose of the seed and hold grange co-op liable for any loss.

Suppose farmer lane grows and sells cotton in a perfectly competitive industry. the market price of cotton is $1.64 per kilogram, and his marginal cost of production is $1.44 per kilogram, which increases with output. assume farmer lane is currently earning a profit. can farmer lane do anything to increase his profit in the short run? farmer lane: a. cannot do anything to increase his profit. b. may or may not be able to increase his profit. c. can increase his profit by raising his price. d. can increase his profit by producing more output. e. can increase his profit by shutting down.

Bayside coatings company purchased waterproofing equipment on january 2, 20y4, for $190,000. the equipment was expected to have a useful life of four years and a residual value of $9,000. instructions: determine the amount of depreciation expense for the years ended december 31, 20y4, 20y5, 20y6, and 20y7, by (a) the straight-line method and (b) the double-declining-balance method. also determine the total depreciation expense for the four years by each method. depreciation expense year straight-line method double-declining-balance method 20y4 $ $ 20y5 20y6 20y7 total $

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?